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SUBMISSION OF LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSES TO THE JURY
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose here is briefly to review the law and applicable
policy considerations concerning the submission of lesser included
offenses to the jury with particular reference to the law of Ne-
braska. The problem of submission of lesser included offenses
to the jury is but a small segment of the broad problem of the
respective spheres of judge and jury. Submission of lesser of-
fenses in other words enables a jury to compromise in violation
of the court's instructions.
A. DEFINITION OF LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE.
An offense is a lesser included offense if (1) the acts neces-
sary to constitute the offense are alleged in the indictment;
(2) the offense is not expressly charged in the indictment ;and
(3) the penalty for committing the offense is less than the penalty
for committing the offense expressly charged in the indictment.
B. TYPES OF LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
Lesser included offenses are of two types, those necessarily
included in the greater offense charged and those which are not.
The first type of included offense is a refinement of the first
element of a lesser included offense, viz., that the acts necessary
to constitute the lesser offense must be charged in the indictment.
An example of this type of included offense is second degree
murder when the only express charge in the indictment is first
degree murder. The reason for this necessary inclusion is that
all of the elements of second degree murder are contained within
the elements of first degree murder which in addition requires
the aggravating element of premeditation. The necessarily in-
cluded offense is an application of the axiom "the whole equals
the sum of its parts".
The second type of lesser included offense is one that is not
necessarily included in the offense charged because it has addi-
tional elements which are not requisites for the commission of
the greater offense. It is a lesser included offense only when
the indictment sets forth the additional elements necessary to
constitute the offense. An example would be adultery under
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an indictment charging rape. If the indictment sets forth the
acts necessary to constitute rape and also states that defendant
was married adultery would be a lesser included offense of rape.
C. STATUTES ALLOWING CONVICTION OF LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
While at common law the jury could not convict of a mis-
demeanor when the indictment charged a felony the jury was
permitted to convict of a lesser included misdemeanor on an in-
dictment charging a misdemeanor or of a lesser included felony
on a greater felony charge provided the acts necessary to con-
stitute the offense were set out in the indictment, viz., the lesser
offense did not have to be of the necessarily included variety.'
Many states have enacted statutes2 governing the submission of
lesser included offenses some of which, in contrast to the com-
mon law rule, have been interpreted to require that the lesser
included offense must be necessarily included.3
Once it is determined that a lesser offense is of a type which
can be submitted to the jury, the next step is to determine whether
the lesser offense can be submitted to the jury in a particular
factual situation.
II. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO HAVE LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSES SUBMITTED TO JURY
A. IN GENERAL
The defendant is entitled to have lesser included offenses,
lesser degrees, or attempts to commit those offenses not specif-
ically charged in the indictment submitted to the jury if the
evidence warrants the instruction. If the trial court refuses to
1 10 Halsbury, Laws of England, § 791 (3rd E& 1955).
2 Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 1159 (1956); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 785.5, 785.6
(1950); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 278, § 12 (1959); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.1055 (1954); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2025 (Reissue 1952); N. Y. Pen.
Law § 610 (1944); Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 13448-2 (1938); Okla. Crim.
Proc. Stat. Ann. § 916 (1937); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2520 (1955).
3 People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589, 184 P.2d 512 (1947); Giles v. United
States, 144 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1944); State v. McCall, 245 Iowa 991,
63 N.W.2d 874 (1954). Liberal statutory construction was accorded
the included offense statute in Comm. v. Squires, 97 Mass. 59 (1867);
Daywood v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. App. 266, 248 S.W.2d 479 (1952);
State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953); State v. Costello,
200 Iowa 313, 202 N.W. 212 (1925); People v. Miller, 143 App. Div.
251, 128 N.Y.Supp. 549, affirmed 292 N.Y. 618, 96 N.E. 1125 (1911).
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submit the instruction on defendant's timely request it is rever-
sible error.
4
The requirement that the instruction on the lesser crime must
be warranted by the evidence merely means that there must
be some evidence which if believed might warrant a conviction
of the lesser offense and it does not matter if the evidence is
slight or circumstantial.5 The tendency of the courts is always
to instruct on the lesser offense upon defendant's request. In
Bradberry v. State,6 for example, the court noted that:
... It is much the safer rule to charge upon all of the de-
grees of homicide included in the indictmnet, when a party is
on trial for murder, unless it is perfectly clear to the judicial
mind that there is no evidence tending to bring the offense within
some particular degree.7
Usually if the lesser offense is of the necessarily included
variety,8 there is a factual question9 which necessitates an in-
struction on the lesser included offense. However, if there is
total lack of evidence to support an instruction on a lesser offense,
it is not error to fail to give the instruction. 0 In State v. Stid-
ham," for example, defendant was convicted of first degree mur-
4 See People v. Pursley, 302 Ill. 62, 134 N.E. 128 (1922); Sigh v. State,
35 Ariz. 432, 280 Pac. 672 (1929).
G See 1 Reid's Branson, Instructions to Juries, § 57 (1936) and 5 Wharton,
Criminal Law and Procedure, § 2099 (1957). In State v. Stortecky,
273 Wis. 362, 77 N.W.2d 721 (1956), the court's dictum pointed out:
"If the evidence in any reasonable view could support any of the
lower degrees requested for submission, the refusal would be error,
for which prejudice to the defendant would be undeniable."
' 37 Ala. 327, 67 So.2d 561 (1953); see also, Kirk v. State, 103 Neb. 484,
172 N.W. 527 (1919).
7 37 Ala. App. 327, 67 So.2d 561, 563 (1953).
8 For example, second degree murder included within a charge of first
degree murder.
9 The element of intent, for example.
1 In stating that the judge should not instruct the jury on lesser offenses
not proved by the evidence the court in People v. Mussenden, 308
N.Y. 558, 127 N.E.2d 551 (1955), said,: "As to the jury's proper func-
tion or duty, that consists solely of applying the legal definitions
of crime, as laid down by the trial court, to the evidence and of con-
viction of the crime charged, if that is established beyond a reason-
able doubt." See also, Key v. State, 211 Ga. 384, 86 S.E.2d 212 (1955);
State v. Mitchell, 181 Kan. 193, 310 P.2d 1063 (1957); Moore v. State,
260 P.2d 410 (1953); 97 Okla. Crim. Rip. 187, 347 U.S. 978 (1953); and
the annotations in 21 A.L.R. 603, 27 A.L.R. 1097 and 102 A.L.R. 1019.
11 305 S.W.2d 7 (1957).
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der and the evidence showed that defendant threatened to kill
the deceased many times prior to the killing and that he had
confessed to premeditated murder. The defense was an alibi.
Defendant urged on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct on second degree murder and manslaughter. The ap-
pellate court held however, that the only submissible issue was
first degree murder and that it was proper to refuse to instruct
on the lesser offenses.
In the opposite situation, where the instruction on the lesser
offense is given at defendant's request and there is no evidence
to support it, there is no error even though, under the circum-
stances, there would have been had the instruction not been re-
quested.12 Hence, if defendant is charged with first degree mur-
der and there is evidence tending to show guilt of a lesser crime
and some evidence supporting an acquittal, although in many
jurisdictions it will be error for the court on its own initiative
to instruct on the lesser offense, it will not be if defendant re-
quests it. The reason usually given is that the defendant in-
vited the error and therefore cannot complain. This doctrine
is followed in Nebraska.'3
If the trial court instructs the jury on any lesser included
crimes, the court must instruct the jury that if there is reason-
able doubt as between the degrees or grades of crime, they must
convict the defendant of the lesser crime.' 4
12 In State v. Gottstein, 111 Wash. 600, 191 Pac. 766, 767 (1920), the
court in refusing to grant a reversal on the grounds that the trial
court instructed on second degree murder and manslaughter at the
request of the defendant when the evidence did not support the in-
struction said: "If, under the evidence, it was error to submit the
question of murder in the second degree, the defendant by his re-
quest invited such error." See also, Stump v. State, 132 Neb. 49,
271 N.W. 163 (1937).
13 See Stump v. State, 132 Neb. 49, 271 N.W. 163 (1937).
14 This is the general rule in the great majority of jurisdictions. See
5 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 2099 (1957); 1 Reid's Bran-
son, Instruction to Juries, § 57 (1936); Ann. 20 A.L.R. 1258.
Contra: Comm. v. Green, 292 Pa. 579, 141 Atl. 624 (1928). In
Pennsylvania the court has no authority to tell the jury the degree
or grade of crime of which the defendant may be convicted. This
question, under statute, is exclusively for the jury. Apparently it
is felt that all matters, including punishment, should be within the
province of the jury when determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
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B. NEBRASKA LAW
In Nebraska, as elsewhere, defendant is entitled to an in-
struction on the lesser included offense if the evidence warrants
such an instruction and a refusal to instruct on the lesser offense
when properly requested by deefndant is reversible error.1 5 Of,
course, if there is no evidence tending to show guilt of the lesser
offense the court's refusal to so instruct is proper.
Nebraska does not have a general statute making an attempt
a lesser included crime. Under Nebraska's statutes, before an
attempt is a crime it must expressly be stated to be a crime else-
where in the statutes.1 6 If the proof shows a completed crime
a minority of courts hold that the defendant cannot be convicted
of attempt because failure is one element of attempt.1 7 Most
courts however hold to the contrary on a theory of harmless error,
harmless because the proof shows a completed offense.' 8 The
majority position of course, requires the assumption that defend-
ant is in fact guilty of the completed offense notwithstanding
that the jury acquitted him and though defendant claims he is
not guilty of anything.
Nebraska has not yet ruled on the question.
III. PROVINCE OF TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT ON
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
The discussion here concerns the right of the trial court to
instruct on lesser included offenses in the absence of a request
by defendant. Whether the court may lawfully do so depends
on the circumstances. Various possible situations will be con-
sidered.
15 In Moore v. State, 147 Neb. 390, 23 N.W.2d 552 (1947), under an in-
dictment charging the defendant with violation of Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-410 (Reissue 1952) the court held that it was prejudicial error
to refuse to give an instruction on assault or assault and battery.
The court relied on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2025 (Reissue 1952).
14 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2025 (Reissue 1952), "Upon an indictment for
an offense consisting of different degrees the jury may find the de-
fendant not guilty of the degree charged, and guilty of any degree
inferior thereto; and upon an indictment for any offense the jury
may find the defendant not guilty of the offense but guilty of an at-
tempt to commit the same, where such an attempt is an offense."
17 See People v. Lardner, 300 IlM. 264, 133 N.E. 375 (1921).
1i See People v. Baxter, 245 Mich. 229, 222 N. W. 149 (1928).
COMMENTS
A. INSTRUCTION WARRANTED; NOT REQUESTED; GIVEN;
CONVICTION ON LESSER OFFENSE
In the first situation (1) the instruction on the lesser offense
is warranted by the evidence; (2) the court instructs on the
lesser offense; (3) defendant does not request the instruction
and; (4) defendant is convicted of the lesser crime.
1. In general
In this situation the courts are agreed that the trial court
may lawfully submit the lesser offense.19
When the lesser offense is necessarily included (second de-
gree murder for example, under a first degree murder indict-
ment) there will almost always be evidence warranting an in-
struction on the lesser offense because the elements making up
the lesser offense are also elements of the greater. Degrees of
homicide, an example of necessarily included offenses, are dis-
tinguished on the basis of the defendant's intent and it is generally
said that intent is a question of fact for the jury.20
2. Nebraska Law
In Nebraska, as elsewhere, .the trial court may clearly in-
struct on lesser offenses if from any view of the evidence the
instruction can be supported. In Kirk v. State,2 1 for example,
defendant shot and killed a policeman and was charged with first
degree murder. A second degree murder instruction was given,
19 In People v. Brown, 415 II. 23, 112 N.E.2d 222 (1953), the defendant
was indicted for murder and convicted of manslaughter. The evidence
showed that the defendant was under the influence of drugs and
possibly insane at the time of the killing. The Supreme Court of
Illinois affirmed the decision, holding that the instruction on man-
slaughter was rightly submitted to the jury since under the facts
the defendant could have been found to not have the mens rea
necessary for a conviction of murder but sufficient to constitute
manslaughter. See also, People v. Bell, 322 Ill. 434, 153 N.E. 639 (1926).
20 In State v. Perry, 78 S.C. 184, 59 S.E. 851, 852 (1907), the court stated:
"The degree of a homicide in any special case depends upon the
motive which prompted the killing, and this is a matter entirely for
the jury." and ". . . whether any particular crime as defined by the
judge has been committed, or whether the case is one of self-defense,
as explained by the judge, is a question of fact, and is alone for the
jury."
21 103 Neb. 484, 172 N.W. 527 (1919).
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however, and defendant was convicted of this offense. In affirm-
ing the court stated:
While the evidence would, no doubt, sustain a conviction of
murder in the first degree, there may be a question as to proof
of deliberation and premeditation, and it was entirely proper
to submit the question of second degree murder for the considera-
tion of the jury.22
B. INSTRUCTION UNWARRANTED; NOT REQUESTED; GIVEN;
CONVICTION ON LESSER OFFENSE
In the second situation there is (1) no evidence tending to
prove the lesser offense; (2) either no evidence supporting an
acquittal or some evidence which, if believed, would support an
acquittal; (3) the evidence warrants a conviction of the higher
offense; (4) the trial court without a request from defendant
instructs on the unsupported lesser offense; and (5) the defendant
is convicted of the lesser offense.
1. In general
Here the cases are conflicting with a majority holding that
the instruction on the lesser offense though technical error is
not ground for reversal. 23 The reasoning of the majority is simply
that the jury doubtless wanted to be lenient and really thought
defendant guilty of the higher offense. The possibility of preju-
22 Id. at 487 and 528.
23 Showing the general feeling of the courts upholding the conviction
of the defendant on a lesser offense unwarranted by the evidence,
the court in Irby v. State, 18 Okla. Crim. Rep. 671, 197 Pac. 526 (1920),
stated: "From a full consideration of all the evidence we are con-
vinced that the jury would have been fully justified in convicting
the defendant of murder, and he has cause to congratulate himself
that the jury found him guilty of manslaughter in the first degree
only, and assessing the minimum punishment." See also, State v.
Quan Sue, 191 Iowa 144, 179 N.W. 972 (1920); Murphy v. People,
9 Colo. 435, 13 Pac. 528 (1887); Houston v. State, 105 Miss. 413, 62
So. 421 (1913). For the effect of a statute allowing the jury to find
the degree of homicide (a necessarily included offense) see People
v. Muhlner, 115 Cal. 303, 47 Pac. 128 (1896). In New Mexico the
question is resolved by statute; New Mex. Stat. § 41-13-1 (1953):
"... no judgment shall be stayed, arrested or in any manner affected
because the evidence shows or tends to show the accused guilty of
a higher degree of the offense than that of which he. is convicted."
Under a statute such as this, it of course would never be reversible
error to instruct the jury on the lesser crime even though there is
no evidence to support the instruction; State v. Horton, 258 P.2d 371
(1953). Compare that case with the overruled case of State v. Reed,
39 P.2d 1005 (1934).
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dice to defendant because the jury compromised is simply ig-
nored. In Lytton v. State,24 for example, the evidence showed
that two persons were quarreling and one picked up a razor and
advanced toward the other who drew a pistol. Defendant, a by-
stander, struck the person who drew the pistol knocking it from
his hand, picked up the pistol and fired at the prostrate victim,
thereby killing him. The indictment charged murder but the
jury was also instructed on manslaughter under the theory of
self-defense and defendant was convicted of manslaughter. The
appellate court affirmed saying:
... if the jury in a homicide case find the defendant guilty
of a lower degree where the law and facts make it murder, it is
error in favor of the defendant of which he cannot complain.25
The minority position seems more realistic: that defendant
was prejudiced by the instruction either because the jury com-
promised or because it led the jury to infer that there was evi-
dence proving the lesser offense.26  In De Graaf v. State,27 for
example, defendant was charged with robbery and the conflicting
testimony showed either a completed offense or nothing. An in-
struction was nevertheless given on assault with intent to rob,
and defendant was convicted of that offense. In reversing, the
court stated:
Where some of the members might, under the evidence pre-
sented,, hesitate or refuse to render a verdict of guilty of the
serious offense charged, with its accompanying heavy penalty,
such hesitation may be dissipated and overcome if instructions
24 12 Okla. Cr. 204, 153 Pac. 620 (1915). For the arguments on how
the consideration of the severeness of the penalty by the jury tends
to result in compromise verdicts and thereby prejudices the defendant,
see 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 400. See also, 37 Neb. L. Rev. 802.
25 12 Okla. Crim. 204, 253 Pac. 620, 622 (1915).
26 Recognizing the possibility that an instruction on the lesser offense
when not warranted by the evidence would mislead the jury the
court in Dickens v. People, 67 Colo. 409, 186 P. 277 (1919), adopted
this statement: "The instructions should in all cases be based upon
the evidence, and an instruction, no matter how correct the principle
which it may announce, that impliedly assumes the existence of evi-
dence which is not given, is erroneous. It is calculated to bewilder
and mislead the jury by producing the impression that in the mind
of the court some such state of facts as the instruction supposes may
be inferred from the evidence given, or concealed within it." See
the other authorities cited therein. Some courts reverse the convic-
tion without going further than saying that the defendant was preju-
diced. See State v. Kruger, 60 Wash. 542, 111 Pac. 769 (1910), and
Berry v. State, 122 Ga. 429, 50 S.E. 345 (1905).
27 34 Ala. App. 137, 37 So.2d 130 (1948).
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be given by the trial court inviting a verdict of guilty of a lesser
offense carrying with it a lighter penalty.28
2. Nebraska Law
The Nebraska court has not yet spoken on the question. While
the court has consistently held that defendant cannot complain
of an instruction more favorable than is required by law, that
rule has not yet been applied to the situation where defendant
is convicted of the unwarranted lesser offense when the evidence
proves the greater offense or nothing.
29
C. INSTRUCTION UNWARRANTED; NOT REQUESTED; GIVEN;
CONVICTION ON GREATER OFFENSE
In a third situation (1) there is no evidence proving the les-
ser crime; (2) the trial court without a request from defendant
instructs on the unwarranted lesser offense; but (3) defendant is
convicted of the greater offense.
1. In general
Here the courts uniformly hold that defendant cannot secure
a reversal. 30 In Bassinger v. State,3 1 for example, defendant was
charged and convicted of first degree murder, but an instruction
28 Id. at 142 and 135.
29 In Denison v. State, 117 Neb. 601, 221 N.W. 683 (1928), under the facts
of the case, it tended to show that the question will probably not
arise in Nebraska. There, defendant, during a mob attack on a group
of Syrians, shot, and killed one of the Syrians. The indictment charged
the defendant with first degree murder. The trial court instructed
the jury on first and second degree murder and manslaughter. The
defendant, on a conviction of manslaughter, alleged that the trial
court erred in submitting the instruction on manslaughter when there
was no evidence to support the instruction. The appellate court af-
firmed the conviction on the ground that the degrees of homicide
were distinguished on the basis of the defendant's intent, and intent
was a question of fact and should be resolved by the jury. On this
point also see, Moore v. State, 148 Neb. 747, 29 N.W.2d 366 (1947) and
State v. Hutter, 145 Neb. 798, 804, 18 N.W.2d 203 (1945), where the
court stated: "We are convinced that the correct rule is that §§ 28-401,
28-402 and 28-403, R.S.1943, defining murder in the first degree,
murder in the second degree and manslaughter, construed with § 29-
2027, R.S.1943, define the degree of criminal homicide, a single offense."
30 See State v. Quinn, 56 Wash. 295, 105 Pac. 818 (1909); anno. 21 A.L.R.
621, 27 A.L.R. 1099, 102 A.L.R. 1025 and 14 R.C.L. 815.
3' 142 Neb. 93, 5 N.W.2d 222 (1942). See also, Solesbee v. State, 204
Ga. 16, 48 S.E.2d 834 (1948).
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was also given on second degree murder. The proof showed
first degree murder or nothing. In affirming, the court said:
If the trial court by this instruction opened the door and
made it possible for the jury to find the defendant guilty of
murder in the second degree and escape the penalty for which the
law imposes for murder in the first degree, it was not error preju-
dicial to the defendant.3 2
2. In Nebraska
The Nebraska cases are in accord.33
IV. THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT
ON LESSER OFFENSES
Here (1) some of the evidence supports an instruction on the
lesser offense; and (2) defendant does not request and the trial
court does not give the instruction.
A. IN GENERAL
The authorities are conflicting on whether a failure to in-
struct on a lesser offense warranted by the evidence is reversible
error in the absence of a request by the defendant.34 The better
rule would be to make it the duty of the trial court to so instruct.
Defendant claims he is innocent of anything and it seems unfair
to ask him to possibly dig his own grave by requesting an in-
struction and thus enabling the jury to compromise. Besides
the question is one of fact and so is for the jury to decide.
32 142 Neb. 93, 103, 5 N.W.2d 222, 228.
33 See Bassinger v. State, 145 Neb. 93, 5 N.W.2d 222 (1942).
34 Supporting the more liberal view the court in State v. Burnett, 213
N.C. 153, 195 S.E. 356, 357 (1938), said: '"When there is evidence tend-
ing to support a milder verdict than the one charged in the bill of
indictment, the defendant is entitled to have the different views pre-
sented to the jury under a proper charge, and an error in this respect
is not cured by a verdict convicting him of the crime charged in the
bill of indictment, for in such case it cannot be known whether the
jury would have convicted of a less degree if the different views,
arising on the evidence, had been correctly presented by the trial
court." The contrary view, where a request must be made before
the defendant can claim prejudicial error is advocated by the court
in State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618 (1955); People v.
Nudo, 38 C.A.2d 381, 101 P.2d 162 (1940).
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B. NEBRASKA LAW
The Nebraska Rule however, is to the contrary. Thus in
McIntyre v. State,30 the court upheld defendant's conviction for
cutting and stabbing with intent to wound notwithstanding the
trial court's failure to instruct on assault and battery, a charge
supported by the evidence:
Even if we should assume that there was sufficient evidence
of a simple assault or of assault and battery, the failure to re-
quest instructions to the jury on these lesser offenses waived
error.3 6
V. CONCLUSION
It must be remembered that the problems raised in instruct-
ing on lesser included offenses are but a small segment of the
broad conflict between the respective spheres of judge and jury.
This discussion does not attempt to cover all of the collateral prob-
lems raised, but it is hoped that the discussion on the central
problems will be beneficial to the reader.
Robert McCalla, '61
35 116 Neb. 600, 218 N.W. 401 (1928).
3,3 Id. at 601 and 402.
